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Tiered Information Disclosure: An Empirical Analysis of the Advance Peek into the
Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment

Abstract
This paper demonstrates the profits earned by informed high frequency traders (HFTs) from two-second
of advance peek into the Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS), provided by Thomson Reuters to
its elite customers. Using individual stocks in the NASDAQ dataset, we show how HFTs trade around
ICS events. We find that liquidity demanders during two seconds of advance peek earn substantive profits,
which are consistent with the notion that HFTs’ informational advantages may increase adverse selection
costs for other market participants. This evidence elucidates the debate on regulatory oversight and helps
circumvent the potentially adverse effects from an advance peek into ICS.
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1. Introduction
Informed trading is a longstanding issue that has been debated extensively. In the absence of
market impediments, all investors should receive information pertinent to the value of a stock or index
immediately and simultaneously. In practice, however, some agents receive the information before it is
disclosed to the general public. The point of contention is that early-informed agents, when combined
with an appropriate trading strategy, can generate substantial profits. In this paper we provide evidence
for the existence of informed trading from two seconds of advance peek into the Michigan Index of
Consumer Sentiment (ICS).
This study is motivated by a report published by the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), which suggested
that certain investors, including many high-frequency traders, received the University of Michigan's
consumer report two seconds before everyone else in 2013. Given that an early peek into the index, when
combined with high frequency trading techniques, can result in windfall profits, the New York Attorney
General in April, 2013 began scrutinizing whether the advance release to some customers violates the
Martin Act, New York's securities law. 1 As part of an agreement with the N.Y. Attorney General’s
office, Thomson Reuters announced on July 8, 2013 that it was suspending its early release practice. The
early release practice sheds new light on the profitability of high frequency informed traders who receive
ICS news earlier.
The two-second early access to the index of consumer sentiment is a fleeting window of
opportunity which is most likely to be exploited by fast speed traders who are equipped with the
technology and they can benefit from this tiered information content.

The literature surveyed by

Menkveld (2016) noted the contentious role played by high frequency traders, notably HFTs and new
trading venues are intricately linked to the extent that they have helped market participants migrate
quickly to electronic trading, which, in turn, has yielded lower transaction costs and more volume. The
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Former Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Harvey Pitt worried that there is both a fairness and a
disclosure
issue.
“Thomson
Reuters
Gives
Elite
Traders
Early
Advantage”,
CNBC
(http://www.cnbc.com/id/100809395).
The source of WSJ news is https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324682204578515963191421602
3

electronic market structure, which relies heavily on automation implies that market participants need to
compete on information processing and trading, both of which HFTs are known to be advantaged by.
Theory suggests that HFTs, as better informed agents, are as good as high frequency market makers in
predicting signs of future market orders and hence provide greater market depth (Ait-Sahalia and Saglam,
2017). Their knowledge of fundamental value can lead low-private value agents to become more
informed market makers, which improves market liquidity (Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan, 2009). There is
also evidence suggesting that HFTs as faster-acting agents are bad. Empirical studies document that
orders placed by fast traders reflect advance information (Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun, 2017;
Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan, 2014; Hendershott and Riodan, 2013). However, this informational
advantage may generate adverse selection costs for other market participants. Bernales (2014) finds that
the result of a speed dispersion between high frequency traders and ordinary traders leads to less gains
from trade being realized. Slow traders are effectively forced out of using limit orders due to the increased
adverse selection risk. Baron, Brogaard, Hagströmer, and Kirilenko (2018) demonstrate that high
frequency traders earn short-term profits on their market orders, at the expense of other market
participants.
The combination of fast speed in trading and in information access by high frequency traders can
be harmful and/or beneficial for the market. Bongaerts and Van Achter (2016) focus on high frequency
market makers’ price competition in a limit-order market and find that increased speed of contract rate
leads to faster undercutting and therefore benefits liquidity. Nonetheless, if furthermore high frequency
market makers have an informational advantage, then liquidity is reduced because of increased adverse
selection risk for other trader market makers (Jovanovic and Menkveld, 2016). Biais, Foucault, and
Moinas (2015) theoretically predict that the provision of high speed market connections permitting fast
traders to obtain information before slow traders generates adverse selection and negative externalities.
These can lead to overinvestment in fast trading technologies in equilibrium. Given HFTs’ access to stateof-the-art information technology and the extensive role they play as liquidity providers in financial
markets, the question whether tiered information disclosure when combined with fast trading technologies
4

imposes adverse selection costs to other traders and grants fast traders short-term profits is worth
investigating empirically.
We focus our empirical investigation on the NASDAQ high frequency dataset because it
explicitly identifies HFTs from non-HFTs. The dataset also identifies whether HFTs are supplying
liquidity or demanding liquidity 2 . These two features give us a unique opportunity to provide direct
evidence concerning the role of HFTs during two seconds of advance peek into the Michigan Index of
Consumer Sentiment, compared to the contemporaneous work by Hu, Pan, and Wang (2017). 3 In
addition, we study individual stocks as opposed to a single composite index, and by combining with the
Nasdaq dataset it allows us to study how HFTs trade around these events. We show that informed trading
by HFTs during the two-second advance peek is prevalent in our sample. Given the extremely short time
window of two seconds to access this tiered information, it is likely that this information release will
bring significant benefits to liquidity-demanding HFTs. On the assumption that liquidity-demanding
HFTs have an informational advantage during the advance peek, we estimate their profit from exploiting
the two-second window period prior to the ICS announcements. We assume that informed HFTs open
their trading positions during the advance peek before closing them out two or several seconds later. The
maximum cumulative profit of an informed liquidity-demanding HFT for 26 HFT firms is in the order of
$2.5 million for individual stocks listed on NASDAQ and NYSE. 4 Furthermore, there is evidence of a

2

By supplying liquidity, we mean the limit order standing on the order book that was hit by a marketable order (i.e.,
a market order or a more recent limit order taking the opposite side of the transaction).
3
Hu et al. (2017) address the early peek advantage of the ICS and focus on the trading and price behavior in E-mini
S&P 500 futures without differentiating HFTs from non-HFTs, and liquidity demanders from liquidity suppliers.
4
This profit is computed based on extrapolating the profit made by HFTs from trading a stratified sample of 118
stocks, which is highly representative of both the NASDAQ and NYSE markets totaling over 7000 stocks. We
have not considered other types of financial instruments like futures and composite indices, which are likely to
increase the profit made by HFTs by manifold as a result of early peek advantages. Our computation of HFTs’
profit amounting to $41,637, which arises from early peek advantage and computed from 118 stocks, is also
believed to be a conservative estimate given that: (i) our profit calculation also includes HFTs who may not have
access to an early peek and therefore could have opened their trade position wrongly or trade in the direction that
contradicts the news in that two-second window period; (ii) there is misclassification of some HFTs as non-HFTs;
(iii) the profit calculation includes only 118 sample stocks of which more than 97% of the profit comes from 40
large-size firms; and (iv) we have made the assumption that HFTs established their stock positions within one
second after they had an early peek of the ICS.
5

first-mover advantage in that the earlier the informed traders exploit information obtained during the
advance peek, the bigger their profit will be.
This study contributes to the existing literature in three important ways. First, the impact of HFT
on market quality has attracted substantial interest in the past several years (Brogaard, 2010; Hendershott,
Jones, and Menkveld, 2011; Hirschey, 2018; Angel, 2014; Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan, 2014;
Goldstein, Kumar, and Graves, 2014; Jarnecic and Snape, 2014; Laughlin, Aguirre, and Grundfest, 2014;
Scholtus, van Dijk, and Frijns, 2014; Aitken, Cumming, and Zhan, 2015; Aitken, Aspris, Foley, and
Harris, 2018; O’Hara, 2015; Manahov, 2016). Parallel with this, a vibrant literature exists on trading
activity around macroeconomic announcements (Ederington and Lee, 1993; Fleming and Remolona 1999;
Flannery and Protopapadakis, 2001; Balduzzi, Elton, and Green, 2001; Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold,
and Vega, 2003; Erenburg, Kurov, and Lasser, 2006; Tetlock, 2010). Our paper stands at the intersection
of the HFT and macroeconomic announcements literature, and examines the roles of HFT around the
advance release of the University of Michigan's consumer report.
The second contribution relates to the contention of tiered information release as a form of insider
trading, which could disadvantage retail and long-term investors. Past studies look at an informed trading
period of a longer duration ranging from several minutes (Bernile, Hu, and Tang, 2016), to several hours
(Chakravarty and McConnell, 1997, 1999; Fishe and Robe, 2004), to several days and months
(Meulbroek, 1992; Cornell and Sirri, 1992; Seyhun, 1986, 1992; Inci, Lu, and Seyhun, 2010). Fishe and
Robe (2004) study five stockbrokers acquiring information from Business Week’s “Inside Wall Street”
(IWS) column at least four hours before it is released to the public. 5 Our results provide stark contrast in
the duration (two seconds versus four hours) for which information that moves the market is acquired
before it becomes public. Previous insider trading literature focused more on the ability of corporate
insiders to exploit non-public information content for their own advantage (Hirschey and Zaima, 1989;
Seyhun, 1990; John and Lang, 1991; Lee, Mikkelson, and Partch, 1992; Irvine, Lipson, and Pucketti,
5

Fishe and Robe (2004) state that the broker obtained information about the publicly traded firms “in the early
afternoon on Thursdays, before the public release of portions of the magazine over news wire (at 5:15 p.m.) and
electronic distribution on America Online (at 7:00 p.m.)” (pp. 466-467).
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2007). In this paper the information content of insider trading is on ICS, which is released in a tiered
fashion and is accessible by market participants for some fees. A concern of this practice is that along
with colocation, this two-tiered access to information grants HFTs a time advantage in accessing marketmoving information that allows for latency arbitrage.
While helping price discovery in the very near term, latency arbitrage by HFTs discourages
fundamental analysis on the side of slow traders. Given that HFTs’ trades are clearly oriented to the very
short-term and their algorithmic trades are programmed to quickly react to immediate news, it remains
doubtful whether algorithms are also modeled to absorb information on longer-term fundamentals.
Moreover, HFTs are also generally known not to have a real interest in securities they trade, nor in their
issuers. They mainly look at real-time market trends, information concerning transactions occurring in
each market they trade, and order updates posted by other market participants, in order to predictively
anticipate the market. As such, it has been argued that insider trading 2.0 may negatively affect price
informativeness and real resource allocation in the long run (Balp and Strampelli, 2018).
Thirdly and finally, this paper contributes to the literature on what advantages are enjoyed by
HFTs before public information releases. A growing literature on this subject studies how informed
HFTs affect price discovery of stock prices before public news releases (Bernile et al., 2016; Kadan,
Michaely, and Moulton, 2015; Rogers, Skinner, and Zechman, 2017; Lucca and Moench, 2015). Kadan et
al. (2015) document the occurrence of information leakage before analyst recommendations are publicly
announced. Rogers et al. (2017) discover that equity prices respond to the SEC filing news around 30
seconds before public posting. Lucca and Moench (2015) show there are large average excess returns on
U.S. equities before scheduled meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Our results
complement these studies as we document the existence of large profits that are earned ahead of the
release of the University of Michigan's consumer report. The nature of the information structure of ICS is
also different from previous studies because we can identify the exact time when high frequency traders
received material information through the selective disclosure process by Thomson Reuters.

7

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the practice of an advance peek into ICS and
discusses the testable hypotheses. Section 3 presents NASDAQ high frequency trade data and the
classification of positive and negative ICS news. Section 4 provides empirical results. Section 5 provides
some robustness analyses. Section 6 concludes with some policy implications.
2. Advance Peek into the Index of Consumer Sentiment and Testable Hypotheses
2.1 The History of Surveys on Consumer Sentiment and the Two-Second Advance Peek
The University of Michigan (UM) started conducting surveys of consumer sentiment in 1946.
The Surveys of Consumers are influential in public policy and in business circles, providing a gauge of
consumer anticipation of changes in the economic environment. One part of the surveys, the Index of
Consumer Expectations, is an official component of the U.S. Index of Leading Economic Indicators,
which is a key element for understanding and forecasting changes in the national economy. The UM
signed an agreement with Thomson Reuters in 2006, which gave the international news organization the
exclusive right to distribute the highly regarded surveys of consumers. The survey was renamed the
Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers. Under this agreement, effective January
1, 2007, Thomson Reuters has the exclusive right to distribute the headline survey index numbers through
its news and media services. Thomson Reuters also provides this data exclusively to more elite customers,
who subscribe to its high-speed data feed, to receive the information at 9:54:58 (i.e., two seconds) prior to
the data release to Thomson Reuters’ other clients. 6 In exchange for exclusive access to the data, the
contract stipulates that Thomson Reuters pays the University of Michigan $1 million per year, in addition
to a “contingent fee” that is based on the revenue generated by Thomson Reuters.
It was not until June 12, 2013 that this two-second advance peek practice caught the attention of
the media and was reported by CNBC and the Wall Street Journal, respectively. Both news reports
highlighted the instantaneous response of the market when Thomson Reuters transmitted the data to its
elite group of traders on May 17, 2013. Such anecdotal evidence is indicative of the work of high
frequency traders who are likely to have access to the two-second advance release of Thomson Reuters’
6

See http://www.cnbc.com/id/100809395.
8

consumer survey data. Since July 2013, Thomson Reuters has suspended the two-second early release of
its ICS report to their elite subscribers at the behest of the New York Attorney General. The New York
Attorney General is investigating whether this tiered system constitutes a violation of insider trading
regulations, despite UM spokesperson Rick Fitzgerald maintaining that the UM’s arrangement with
Thomson Reuters complied with regulations and that the index is produced with private funds.
2.2 Empirical Hypotheses
2.2.1 Trading Characteristics of Informed HFTs
We hypothesize that other things being equal, informed HFTs will trade in the direction of stock
price movement as predicted by ICS news in the two-second advance peek. These predictions are well
substantiated by the literature on HFTs’ trading behavior and characteristics. The model of Foucault,
Hombert, and Rosu (2016) predicts that informed HFTs are prone to trade aggressively when they have
faster access to news than other traders. Using a dynamic version of Kyle’s (1985) model that
incorporates new information about the payoff of a risky security, Foucault et al. (2016) demonstrate that
the speed advantage to accessing news affects a trader’s optimal strategy insofar as it affects the forecast
of the asset payoff. HFTs are known to have speed advantage through their use of computer algorithms
and by placing their computers in stock exchange data centers so they can trade faster. The two-second
advance peek provides not only informational advantage, but further enhances the speed trading
advantage that HFTs already possess over ordinary traders. It is important to recognize that in the twosecond window when ICS is released, this tiered information provides HFTs with the ability to predict
stock price movements better. The early release of information facilitates HFTs to trade in the direction of
stock price movements ahead of other investors. We therefore hypothesize HFTs trade in the direction of
stock price movements as predicted by ICS news in the two-second advance peek.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Informed HFTs with early access to the Thomson Reuters/UM consumer sentiment
survey tend to trade aggressively, and their trade imbalance increases (decreases) with positive (negative)
ICS news.
2.2.2 Informed HFTs and Price Discovery
9

It is well recognized that fast trading technologies accelerate access to value-relevant information
for an asset through recent transaction prices and quote changes for this asset. The theoretical model of
Ait-Sahalia and Saglam (2017) analyzes an informed high frequency market maker in a continuous-time
dynamic inventory model in which they find that the liquidity improves if the informed high frequency
market maker is better able to predict the sign of future market orders. Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan (2009)
also find liquidity improvement when market makers become more informed about fundamental value.
The ICS tiered announcements which operate in conjunction with fast trading technologies of high
frequency traders will further enhance relevant-value information for an asset. In the presence of HFTs
who are quick to process public information, this is most likely to influence market consensus about the
value of a stock. When unexpected positive (negative) ICS news is released, stock prices are predicted to
rise (fall). Informed HFTs who process the information in ICS announcements during an advance peek
will trade in the anticipated direction of stock price movements; as such we hypothesize that informed
HFTs’ trade imbalance in the advance peek predicts future price changes or future stock returns.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Informed HFTs with access to the two-second advance peek into ICS display large
trade imbalances, which have predictive power on future returns over a short-term horizon.
2.2.3 Informed HFTs’ Profits
Biais, Foucault, and Moinas (2015) show that financial institutions can decide to become fast
traders because they fear obtaining low profits if they remain slow and so missing out on substantial
financial gains. Fast traders in their model are traders who invest in fast trading technologies that will
improve traders’ ability to find attractive quotes and acquire advance information about asset payoffs. In
this sense, fast traders in their model are akin to informed HFTs who have access to this tiered
information. Additionally, theory also predicts that HFTs exploit their speed advantage by trading with
less informed traders (Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman, 1994; Brunnermeier, 2005; Foucault et al.,
2016). Hirshleifer et al. (1994) show that in a partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium, traders
with early access to information trade aggressively in the initial period. Their model predicts that early
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informed investors appear to be short-term profit takers. In the context of the two-second advance peek,
we hypothesize informed HFTs are able to make substantially larger profits.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Informed HFTs can take advantage of the early release of ICS news and generate
substantial short-term positive profits.
3. Data and News Classification
3.1 The Data
The database consists of 120 stocks listed on the NASDAQ and New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2009. NASDAQ categorizes market participants as a
high-frequency trading firm or non-high frequency trading firm, which allows us to identify investor
types. The dataset also identifies what type of traders is supplying liquidity and demanding liquidity.
CNBC reported that Thomson Reuters began to permit an elite group of clients to receive ICS information
two seconds prior to the data release to other clients in September, 2009. We divide our total sample into
pre- and post-September, 2009 samples and find that the practice of this advance peek is prevalent prior to
September, 2009. 7 Our results indicate that the two-second advance peek on ICS may have occurred
before January 2008. These results are consistent with the findings of Hu et al. (2017), who show that
Reuters started to distribute ICS in multiple tiers sometime in 2007. It is noteworthy that the sample
period available for the NASDAQ data coincides with the practice of ICS early release. Thus for a
“treatment effect” analysis to take place over a longer time horizon requires the use of a different dataset
like the S&P 500 exchange traded funds (ETFs) data, which is discussed in section 5 under robustness
analysis. Nonetheless, the ETFs data, unlike the NASDAQ data, do not differentiate the HFTs from nonHFTs.
All trades are time-stamped to the millisecond, and the demanders and suppliers of liquidity are
identified either as a high frequency trader (HFT) or non-high frequency trader (non-HFT). This is the

7

Results based on the data for the post-September 2009 sample are not reported for brevity, but they are available
from the author upon request. By and large, we find the effects of ICS early release in the post-September 2009
sample on return and trade dynamics are equally as strong as, if not stronger than, in the pre-September 2009
sample.
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advantage of using the NASDAQ HFT data because each trader’s status is explicitly provided. NASDAQ
uses its knowledge of its customers to categorize whether a firm is a HFT. Although the data identify
some HFTs, they suffer from a drawback in that not all HFTs are identified (Brogaard et al., 2014). Some
large integrated firms that function as brokers for customers and are involved in proprietary lowerfrequency trading strategies are not included in the data. In addition, HFTs that direct their orders through
these large integrated firms are also not included in the sample. The 26 HFT firms in the NASDAQ data
can be regarded as independent proprietary trading firms. 8
The data also provide the following information: the NASDAQ trading symbol for a stock, the
date and time for which trading occurred, the number of shares traded and the associated price, and
whether the trade was buyer-initiated or seller-initiated. It also identifies type of traders who are involved
in the transaction, denoted by H or N.

The first (second) letter denotes the liquidity-demanding

(supplying) participant in a transaction. Accordingly, a transaction can fall into one of four trading type
combinations. The HH (HN) combination denotes a transaction in which a HFT demands liquidity and
another HFT (non-HFT) supplies that liquidity. The NN (NH) combination denotes a transaction in which
a non-HFT demands liquidity and another non-HFT (HFT) supplies that liquidity. The remainder of the
paper denotes HFT liquidity-demanding trades as HFTD (HH plus HN). We use this notation for HFT
trading volume (buy volume plus sell volume) and HFT trade imbalance. The HFT trade imbalance is
defined as the net trading volume, which is the HFT buyer-initiated volume minus HFT seller-initiated
volume. This definition is consistent with Hirschey’s (2018) measure of net marketable buying
imbalance.
Along with the NASDAQ HFT data, we also use supplementary data to retrieve the national best
bid and best offer (NBBO) from the NYSE Trade and Quoting (TAQ) database and the NASDAQ best
bid and best offer (NASDAQ BBO). The NBBO data provide best prices that prevail in all markets over
2008 and 2009, thus permitting a study on market-wide price discovery. NASDAQ BBO, however, only

8

These 26 firms represent a significant amount of trading activity that NASDAQ believes characterizes them as
HFTs.
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provides the best available prices on NASDAQ for the first week of every quarter in 2008 and 2009, and
thus this dataset is less informative than NBBO. We use the NBBO data to compute stock returns.
Following Brogaard et al. (2014), we categorize stocks into three market capitalization groups - large,
medium and small. Market capitalization data are based on the end-of-2009 data obtained from S&P
Compustat. We drop two stocks, Boise Inc. (BZ) and MAKO Surgical Corp. (MAKO), because they do
not appear in the TAQ database for part of our sample period.
3.2 Classification of Early Release of the Survey Data as Positive and Negative News
Our hypotheses focus on the information content associated with the early release of Thomson
Reuters/UM survey data on the behavior of HFTs’ trading activities. To test these hypotheses, we
measure news surprises of the ICS announcements as the difference between market expectations and the
announced values of ICS. This measure is consistent with the convention of computing news surprises in
the literature of macroeconomic announcements. 9 To establish whether there are asymmetric effects, we
classify an early release of survey data as positive or negative news, using the announcement surprises
based on the Thomson Reuters survey of economists. Every two weeks Thomson Reuters contacts a
cross-section of economists for the purpose of collecting their forecasts of the consumer sentiment index.
The median of collected forecasts serves as an estimate for the market expectations of the upcoming
releases. The unexpected component for the survey of consumer data is estimated by computing the
difference between the early released value for the Thomson Reuters/UM Index of Consumer Sentiment
and the median forecast from the Thomson Reuters Survey of Economists. When the value for the ICS is
higher (lower) than the median forecast from the Thomson Reuters Survey of Economists, it is regarded
as positive (negative) news.
4. Empirical Results
4.1 Preliminary Data Analysis
Figure 1 shows the intraday patterns of trading volume (Figures 1a and 1b), trade imbalance
(Figures 1c and 1d), and stock returns (Figures 1e and 1f) on days with and without ICS announcements
9

See, for example, Adams, McQueen, and Wood (2004) and Boyd, Hu, and Jagannathan (2005).
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for the first sample. In each figure, the solid (dotted) line depicts characteristics of the variable in question
on the ICS announcement (non-ICS announcement) days, which are the days when early releases of the
consumer surveys are (not) reported. 10 The non-ICS announcement days are used as a control sample to
compare and contrast the effect of two-second advance peeks on trading characteristics.
-

Figure 1 about here -

The trading volume in Figures 1a and 1b, which is measured by the number of shares scaled by
daily average one-second volume, displays a significant jump at 9:54:58, or two seconds prior to the
release of the consumer survey data to non-elite subscriber clients for positive and negative ICS reports.
In fact, the trading volume at 9:54:58 is higher for bad news than that for good news, suggesting that
HFTs may have more incentive to exploit the two-second early release of negative consumer sentiment
news to their advantage. Given that part of the sample falls in the period during the global financial crisis
when traders were more cautious in a bear market, it is not surprising that we find: firstly, the response to
trading volume is higher; and secondly, reversal to the pseudo-event level is faster for bad news than for
good news during the early release of ICS.
Figures 1c and 1d depict the response of trade imbalance, which is defined as the per second
cumulative difference between buyer-initiated volume and seller-initiated volume to the advance peek on
ICS. The figure shows a sharp hike (drop) with buy (sell) orders significantly exceeding sell (buy) orders
at 9:54:58. In contrast, no trade imbalance jump is observed on non-ICS announcement days. The
response of trade imbalance to the early release of consumer survey news suggests that traders with
access to this information are able to exploit it to their advantage by placing greater buy (sell) orders in
anticipation of market reaction to positive (negative) news.
Figures 1e and 1f show the response of stock return to the early release of consumer survey data.
Stock return is computed as the first difference of the logarithmic price across one second. It can be seen

10

Preliminary (Final) announcements occur on the second (last) Fridays of the month. Non-ICS announcement days
are the same day when no announcements are made. However, in the event of a holiday on these nonannouncement days, we use the prior day.
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that returns jumped (dropped) to an all high (low) of 1.75% (-1.2%) at two seconds prior to the consumer
survey data release. The significant burst in trading activities reflects the nature of consumer survey news.
To summarize, the early release of consumer survey data has significant effects on trading
activity and stock returns; traders behave very differently on ICS announcement days compared to nonICS announcement days. Furthermore, the persistence of the responses in trade volume, and trade
imbalance is contingent on the news about whether the consumer survey is positive or negative. There is
also evidence that the two-second early release of consumer survey data leads to some degree of price
discovery as reflected by the sharp difference in the level of stock returns at 9:54:58. a.m.
For the purpose of robustness, instead of comparing ICS days to non‐announcement days, we also
compare results to a control sample with announcement days on new home sales, which no early peek
access was sold. These results, provided in Figure A1 in the Appendix, indicate there is no abnormal
trading activity two-second before the news release. 11
4.2 Return and Trade Characteristics around ICS Advance Peek
Table 1 reports return and trade characteristics from January 1, 2008 to August 31, 2009 around
ICS advance peek. We compute the one-second interval trade volume, trade imbalance and stock return
before and after ICS announcements at 9:55 a.m.
ICS announcement days are ICS announcement Fridays and non-ICS announcement days are also
Fridays but with no ICS announcements made. HFTD and non-HFTD denote liquidity demanders of (non-)

11

In Figure A1 the observed spikes in trading volume (Panel a) for positive news of new home sales, trade
imbalance (Panel c) and returns (Panel e) are consistent with the view that there is evidence of pre-announcement
drift on stocks for certain announcements (see Kurov et al., 2017). Although these spikes are observed in a few
seconds prior to the actual announcement of new home sales news, it is visible that the magnitude of the spike is
never as large as the jump which occurs on the actual time (or one second lag) of the announcement. To determine
whether there is any statistically significant result in the difference of trading volume, trade imbalance and returns in
the time periods 9:59:58-10:00:00 and 10:00:00-10:00:02, we compute the mean difference test under the null that
the mean difference is zero. To conserve space, the results are not presented here but are available from the authors
upon request. The test generally rejects the equality in the return, volume and trade imbalance in the two periods,
and the magnitude of return, volume and trade imbalance are in the right order (i.e. it is larger in 10:00:00-10:00:02
compared to that in 9:59:58-10:00:00). Comparing these results with the results in Table 1 for the ICS news, it can
be seen that the magnitude of return, volume and trade imbalance is larger during the early release of ICS news
compared to post-release of news, a pattern which differs from those concerning new home sales news. Overall
these results imply that the two seconds early release of ICS news did exert an impact on trading characteristics to
the extent that the magnitude of its effect is larger than that of post-announcement.
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high frequency traders. When the value for the ICS is higher (lower) than the median forecast from the
Thomson Reuters Survey of Economists, it is regarded as positive (negative) consumer sentiment news.
-

Table 1 about here -

Panel A of Table 1 reports the results for ICS announcement days and panel B for non-ICS
announcement days. In Columns (4) and (7) of Table 1, we report mean difference tests on returns, trade
volume and trade imbalance for negative and positive consumer sentiment news. We find that returns are
larger in magnitude during the early peek period (9:54:58 to 9:55:00). The differences before and after
ICS announcements at 9:55 a.m. are statistically significant. Similar to the results of returns, we also find
abnormally high trade volume and trade imbalance for liquidity demanders of HFT in the early peek
period. The difference in trading volume is statistically significant between 9:54:58-9:55:00 and 9:55:009:55:02 for negative news and for HFTD. However, this is not statistically significant for positive news. In
the case of trade imbalance, we observe that the trade imbalance for both HFTD and non-HFTD are larger
in the early peek. While it appears that both HFTs and non-HFTs appear to respond in the same way to
early peek, it is important to recognize that this observation is subject to two caveats: (a) some HFTs are
classified as non-HFTs with no clear and obvious way of identifying them within the non-HFTs
classification, and (b) the number of non-HFTs far outweighs the 26 HFTs. These results suggest that
early informed traders utilize information about ICS negative news and place higher marketable sell
orders than marketable buy orders, and the reverse is true for ICS positive news.
Taken together, it can be seen from Table 1 that informed traders during the two-second advance
peek are able to utilize information from early access to ICS announcements to influence market prices
and trade imbalances. The results also show that the average trade imbalance has an opposite sign for
positive and negative consumer sentiment news, which indicate that HFTD buy on positive- and sell on
negative ICS news.
Panel B of Table 1 reports results for non-ICS announcement days. We find that return, volume,
and trade imbalance before and after ICS announcements at 9:55 a.m. are similar in magnitude. These
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results support Hypothesis 1—informed HFTs (in particular, liquidity-demanding HFTs) trade
aggressively, which is manifested through higher trading volume and trade imbalance in the two seconds
prior to the ICS releases. In addition, stock returns are positively and negatively higher for both positiveand negative ICS news.
Finally, in unreported results, we compare trade characteristics of HFTs and non-HFTs for the
NASDAQ data during the period January 2008 – September 2009 by executing the difference-indifference tests in two stages. In the first stage, we compute the difference in trade volume, trade
imbalance and frequency for the period (9:54:58-9:55:00) and (9:55:00-9:55:02). In the second stage, we
test the difference in trade volume, trade imbalance and frequency between the HFTD and non-HFTD. The
results seemingly fail to support the prediction that trade volume and frequency of HFTD who exploited
ICS early release would display higher order of magnitude for positive news relative to those of nonHFTD. The results appear to hold only in the case of negative consumer sentiment news. In addition, the
trade imbalance results do not suggest that there is any statistically significant difference between HFTD
and non-HFTD.
Nevertheless, we would interpret these results with caution given that there are differences in the
number of trading accounts of HFTD and non-HFTD. There are 26 firms that are classified as HFTD but the
number of non-HFTD including all other trading accounts in the market - is significantly larger than 26.
Consequently, the effect of ICS early release on the order of the magnitude of the trade volume, trade
imbalance and frequency may be masked by trading activity that is closely associated with the larger
number of non-HFTD. Additionally, the results can be biased by an inherent limitation in the NASDAQ
data, i.e. not all HFT are identified (Brogaard et al. 2014). Consequently, the apparent larger order of
magnitude in the variable associated with non-HFTD can be attributed to some HFTD being classified as
non-HFTD. In principle, we cannot interpret the prima facie mixed evidence in the difference of trade
characteristics between HFTD and non-HFTD. For these reasons, we do not report the results but they are
available from the authors upon request.
4.3 Determinants of Trade Imbalance Dynamics Surrounding ICS Announcements
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To examine the determinants of trade imbalance dynamics surrounding ICS announcements, we
modify Fishe and Robe’s (2004) empirical specifications to perform the following pooled ordinary least
squares (OLS) regressions using one-second data over the five-minute intervals before and after ICS
announcements at 9:55 a.m.; 12 and the standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity according to
White (1980):
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷 = Intercept + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝜀𝜀1 (1)

In equation (1), the dependent variable 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷 (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷 ) denotes per second trade imbalance of

HFTD (non-HFTD). Here, the dependent variable is replaced with 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷 for non-HFTs. Each type

of trader’s trade imbalance is standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one for
each stock on each announcement day. The differences in trade imbalances between early peek and the
release of ICS are examined over a number of factors. Regression (1) analyses trade imbalance
differences between early peek and ICS release while controlling for the market capitalization of stocks,
the type of ICS announcements (mid-month or end-of-month) and the magnitude of news surprises. In all
regressions, the time interval dummy variables, EarlyPeek and Release denote the two-second advance
peek duration (9:54:58 through 9:54:59) and two-second interval after a broader release (9:55:00 through
9:55:01), respectively. The results of regression (1) are reported in Panel A of Table 2.
Panel B reports the regression results, which consider the presence of trade imbalance between
early peek and ICS release for stocks with different market capitalization. Here, Large is a dummy
variable for large market capitalization stocks, such that it takes the value of 1 if the stock is large cap and
0 otherwise. Panel C reports the regression results for trade imbalance differences between early peek and
ICS release for the timing of the ICS announcements. Here, Final is a dummy variable that equals one for
end-of-month ICS announcements and zero for middle-of-month ICS announcements. The Final dummy
variable determines whether the mid-month or final-month ICS announcements are more informative in
influencing (non-)HFT’s trade imbalances. Panel D reports the results of the regression which studies the
12

Our results are not sensitive to the choices of time intervals. We perform the analysis with 10-minute and 15minute time intervals and the results remain qualitatively unchanged.
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effect of heterogeneity in surprises on HFT’s trade imbalances. Surprise is measured by the absolute
difference between the actual and expected ICS. Panel E shows the regression results which allow for
interaction terms of the EarlyPeek and Release dummies and the other covariates.
- Table 2 about here Table 2 reports the results of the determinants of per second trade imbalance of HFTD and nonHFTD in the five-minute intervals before and after ICS announcements at 9:55 a.m. We find that the
coefficients of EarlyPeek are statistically significant in all cases, implying that the two-second advance
peek has an impact on trade imbalance. The baseline regression results in Panel A show that negative
(positive) news decreases (increases) trade imbalance, which supports our finding in Table 1 that
liquidity-demanding high frequency traders sell (buy) more with the early release of negative (positive)
ICS news. The coefficient of EarlyPeek for the non-HFTD regression is also statistically significant albeit
the magnitude of the coefficient is half that of HFTD regression. As previously explained, this statistical
significance can be caused by an inherent limitation in the NASDAQ data. That is, not all HFTs are
identified and some HFTD are being classified as non-HFTD. Following the tiered announcements of ICS,
news about consumer sentiment continues to exert an influence on trade imbalance for two seconds.
However, the degree of responsiveness of trade imbalance to news of ICS at this point is lower than that
of the advance peek (9:54:58 through 9:54:59) as judged by the magnitude of the coefficients.
Panel B shows that the coefficients of the interactive term between EarlyPeek and large cap
stocks are statistically significant and have the same sign like those of EarlyPeek and Release suggesting
that trade imbalances of stocks with large market capitalization change more appreciably than stocks with
small or medium market capitalization. This is not surprising because HFTs have a propensity to trade in
stocks with larger market capitalization, which are more liquid. Panel C shows that the coefficients of the
interactive dummy variables EarlyPeek and Final, and those of Release and Final, are statistically
significant and have the opposite sign from those of EarlyPeek and Release. These results suggest that
final reports of ICS news are less informative than mid-month reports because the former tends to have a
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smaller effect on trade imbalance. This outcome is not surprising because information about the state of
the economy is contained in the mid-month ICS report, while the final report tends to reflect minor data
revisions of the mid-month ICS report. Panel D shows the coefficients of the interactive term between
EarlyPeek and Surprise, and the interactive term between Release and Surprise are by and large
statistically significant, suggesting that large surprises in the news exert a bigger effect on trade
imbalances of traders. Additionally, the effect of large news surprises on trade imbalance is not only more
appreciable during tiered information release but particularly so with HFTD. Panel E, which reports the
regression results that incorporate all of the interaction terms considered in Panels B to D, shows that the
results are largely robust when these covariates are considered simultaneously.
4.4 The Price Discovery Process of Trading on Advance Peek Information
To study the price discovery process of trading on advance peek information, we perform the
following pooled OLS regressions using one-second data over the five-minute intervals before and after
ICS announcements at 9:55 a.m.; and the standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity according to
White (1980):
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = Intercept + �
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The purpose of this regression is to examine whether trade imbalances, particularly during the two-second
duration of the advance peek, have predictive power on stock returns. Here, the dependent variable of
both regressions (2) and (3), 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 denotes the one-second interval stock returns. The explanatory variables
𝐷𝐷
𝐷𝐷
comprise 𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼_𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖
and 𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼_𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖
, which denote the trade imbalance of HFTD and non-HFTD,

respectively. The variable Release is a dummy variable defined as one at event time 9:55:00 a.m. and one

second after the ICS announcement, and zero otherwise. This dummy variable interacts with various
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lagged trade imbalances of HFTD and non-HFTD to capture the effect of trade imbalance on stock returns
surrounding the timing of the ICS announcement, focusing particularly in the two seconds prior to the
actual announcement time of 9:55:00 a.m. Our interest is in the coefficients of the interactive dummy
variable between D and the lagged trade imbalances of t-2 and t-3, which can be interpreted as the
information that is contained in ICS announcements when released two seconds before 9:55:00 a.m.
Regression (2), unlike regression (3), does not include the interaction term between the dummy variable
and the various lagged trade imbalances of HFTD and non-HFTD. In effect, regression (2) seeks to
validate the predictive power of current and past trade imbalances of HFTD and non-HFTD on current
stock returns unconditional on the timing of the ICS announcement.
It is important to exploit the value of the cross-section of stocks. It is unlikely that all stocks have
similar levels of HFT and by splitting stocks according to their market capitalization it may reveal any
difference in the impact of HFT vs. non-HFT trade imbalance on stock returns. To this end, we perform
regression (3) for each category of stocks: stocks with large, medium and small market capitalization.
Finally, we test whether the impact of HFT vs. non-HFT trade imbalance on stock returns is different
across heterogeneity in the surprise levels associated with ICS early peek. Surprise is defined as the
absolute difference between actual and expected ICS. The idea is that when new information is “truly”
permeating the market or when there is high/large surprise in the ICS announcements, there may be a
stronger price discovery process associated with early peek.
- Table 3 about here Table 3 shows the results of regressions of one-second interval stock returns on trade imbalance
for transaction data in five-minute intervals before and after ICS announcements. It can be seen in Model
1 (i.e. regression 2) that for both negative and positive consumer sentiment news, current and past trade
imbalances of both HFTDs and non-HFTDs have predictive power on current stock returns. Model 2 (i.e.
regression 3) includes interactive variables between the dummy variable and lagged trade imbalances. It
is interesting to note that the coefficients of the interactive dummy variable Release with trade imbalance
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of liquidity-demanding HFTs are statistically significant for the time period t until t-3. The interactive
dummy variable between Release and the lagged trade imbalances of t-2 and t-3 can be interpreted as the
information that is contained in ICS announcements when released two seconds before 9:55:00 a.m. The
statistically significant and positive coefficients of these variables suggest that the trade imbalances two
seconds before the ICS announcements contain information that strongly predicts current stock returns.
For example, for ICS positive news released at 9:54:58 a.m. and 9:54:59 a.m., informed HFTs incorporate
this information to formulate the direction of their trade, which gives rise to greater trade imbalances. In
this situation, they will buy in anticipation of a further rise in stock prices when ICS news is announced at
9:55:00 a.m. The increase in demand for stocks leads to greater trade imbalances, which in turn leads to
an increase in stock returns. The impact on returns due to an increase in trade imbalance is positive during
the advance peek, implying that informed HFTs stand to gain from higher stock returns as a result of early
access to ICS news. The significance in the coefficient of the interactive terms for the periods t-2 and t-3
is observed only for HFTD, suggesting that it is the increase in trade imbalance of liquidity-demanding
HFTs that facilitates the price discovery process. Taken together, our results clearly support Hypothesis
2. 13
- Tables 4 and 5 about here Table 4 shows the results of regressions of one-second interval stock returns on trade imbalance
for transaction data in five-minute intervals before and after ICS announcements but separated by stocks
market capitalization. Consistent with the results shown in Table 3, we find that it is the increase in trade
imbalance of liquidity-demanding HFTs for large and medium caps that facilitates the price discovery
process. Irrespective of the sign of news, in the first or two seconds early release of ICS there is evidence
to suggest that the trade imbalance of HFTD has a statistically significant impact on stock returns for large
and medium cap stocks. As well, there is evidence to suggest that with a high level of surprise in the ICS

13

Our results remain qualitatively unchanged and are robust even with the inclusion of a dummy variable which
controls for the presence of no price changes in the dataset. In addition, using trading volume as weights and running
weighted least square regressions yield qualitatively similar results.
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news, the tiered ICS release gives rise to a statistically significant effect of the trade imbalance of HFTD
on stock returns (see Table 5). This finding is consistent with the intuition that when new information is
“truly” permeating the market, the price discovery process is observed to be stronger with early peek.
4.5 Profits of Informed HFTD from Trading on Advance Peek Information
Table 6 reports aggregate profits across all stocks on announcement days. We analyze high
frequency transaction data on ICS announcement days from January 1, 2008 to August 31, 2009. We
assume that traders buy or sell during the two-second advance peek before 9:55:00 a.m. This could be two
seconds prior to 9:55:00 a.m. denoted by “9:54:58”, one second prior denoted by “9:54:59”. For a
conservative estimate of the profits earned by informed traders who utilize pre-release ICS news during
the early peek, we consider both scenarios: (a) traders’ open position is consistent with the sign of

news; buy (sell) for positive (negative) news; and (b) traders’ open position contradicts the sign
of news. We further assume that these positions are closed at different points in time, measured in
seconds, after the ICS announcements at 9:55:00 a.m. The settlement price for closing out a position is
represented by the volume-weighted average price at that time. If no price exists at that time, then we use
the last observable price for that stock. Finally, we compute profits with respect to the duration of traders’
open-close position.
-

Table 6 about here -

It can be seen from Panel A in Table 6 that liquidity-demanding informed traders who exploit ICS
announcements two seconds before they are announced make higher profit than those who exploit the
information one second later. When HFTD close their position between 9:55:00 and 9:55:05 a.m., the
difference in profits is about $30,000. It can be inferred that early access to ICS, coupled with a firstmover advantage, can give rise to large profits. Our results also suggest that informed HFTD will earn the
most if they close out their position four seconds after the ICS announcement (i.e. 9:55:04 a.m.).
Comparing the profits earned by HFTD and non-HFTD who opened their position two seconds prior to
ICS announcements, the difference in profit ranges between $5,000 and $5,500 in the first 5 seconds of
23

closing out a position, thus suggesting that informed HFTD, in general, can make more profit than nonHFTD. This quantum of profit differences may appear economically insignificant at first sight.
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that this conservative profit estimate is in fact economically
significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, the profit is computed based on trades which were executed in
the anticipated direction of market movements based on early peek advantages minus losses of HFTD who
may not have access to an early peek, and therefore they have traded against market movements. Should
the profits be restricted to HFTDs who benefitted from the early peek, the difference in profit between
HFTD and non- HFTD would be substantially larger. Secondly, close to 97% of the profit made is
attributed to trades in stocks with large market capitalization.
While our profit is derived from trades in individual company stocks, it provides a useful indicator for
the sheer size of potential profit made by a HFTD who trades in composite index like the ETFs and E-mini
S&P 500 futures. In this regard our results complement the findings of Hu, Pan, and Wang (2017) who
investigated the impact of early peek advantage on price discovery of the E-mini S&P500 futures but did
not consider the implications on equity and profits between HFTs and non-HFTs. Thirdly, the profit is
computed on the basis of a small sample of stocks (i.e. 118 stocks) considered in the NASDAQ data,
which are constructed using stratified sampling from both the NASDAQ and NYSE. In other words,
while the sample of stocks may be small they are a good representation of the wider NASDAQ and NYSE
markets, which comprise more than 7,000 stocks. Taking a simple extrapolation of the potential profit
made by 26 HFTs who trade in the stocks on both markets would amount to profit larger than $2 million.
Fourthly, HFTs also trade in derivatives and ETFs other than stocks, and it is likely that by having access
to the early peek and trading in these financial instruments there are greater profit-making opportunities,
which are not reflected in our conservative profits estimate. Finally, for the NASDAQ data which we
employed, some HFTs are identified as non-HFTs, which means our results tend to underestimate the
HFTs’ profit and overestimate the non-HFTs’ profit. In sum, our results support Hypothesis 3 that
informed HFTs’ trade imbalance arising from the advance peek into ICS generates substantial positive
profits.
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We also test the difference in mean profits between HFT and non-HFT traders averaged across
stocks for liquidity demanding and liquidity supplying traders. To conserve space, the results which are
not reported here but are available from the authors upon request, show that these differences are by and
large statistically significant for the open position of 9:54:59 and across all periods of close position,
except for 9:55:30 and 9:56:00. We also consider the open position for HFTs in the first two seconds prior
to the official announcement time and their trading volume for each second starting from 9:55:00 to
9:55:05. In the case of negative ICS news the open position amounts to 883,211 shares. Judging by their
trading volume it takes approximately four seconds before they are able to close their position. This result
is consistent with expectations and suggests that their profits are realizable. 14
5. Robustness analyses: Difference-in-difference analysis for S&P 500 ETFs
So far the foregoing analysis is limited by the paucity of NASDAQ data that are available only
for the period January 2008 – September 2009, which comprises 20 months. Since ICS is announced on a
monthly basis, it should provide 20 announcement days during the sample period and a total of 40
announcement days when taking into consideration the preliminary (middle of the month) and revised
(last Friday of the month) announcement. To validate that our results are robust to a longer sample period
which clearly demarcates the period into three sub-periods, namely before the practice of ICS early
release, during the practice of ICS early release and the period when such practice is suspended, we
perform further analysis using the S&P 500 exchange traded funds (ETFs) obtained from the Trade and
Quote (TAQ) database for the period January 2004 – December 2014. To further demonstrate that early
peek of ICS has appreciable effects on market quality, we utilize another macroeconomic announcement
– news home sales – without the practice of early peek and study its effect on market quality.
-

Table 7 about here -
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We thank the referee for suggesting a comparison be made of the opening position of HFTs in the two seconds
before 9:55:00 and their trading volume at and after 9:55:00 to determine whether the profits can be realized. The
results are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 7 presents the returns and trade characteristics for ICS announcement two seconds prior
and post-announcement for the period January 2004 – December 2014. This period is further divided into
three distinct sub-periods: 2004/01-2006/12 (sub-period 1) is associated with the period before the
practice of ICS early release; 2008/01-2013/06 (sub-period 2) is associated with the period when there
was ICS early release; and 2013/07-2014/12 (sub-period 3) is associated with the period when the
practice of ICS early release was suspended. Note that the period 2007 is excluded from our sub-period 1
sample because: (1) we are uncertain about the precise starting date of ICS early release in 2007, and (2)
we must ensure that sub-period 1 signifies the period before the practice of ICS early release. The
exclusion of 2007 data is also reflected in Hu, Pan, and Wang’s (2017) study for similar reasons.
In summary, based on the results in Panels A to C, we find that: (1) there are statistically
significant differences in stock returns, volatility, trading volume, and trading frequency in sub-period 2
compared to the lack of statistically significant difference in the corresponding variable in sub-period 1; 15
(2) in sub-period 2, the order of magnitude of these variables is substantially higher in the two seconds
prior to the ICS release compared to the two seconds post-ICS release thereby suggesting that early
release of ICS did exert some influence on price discovery and trading dynamic; and (3) the trade
characteristics observed in sub-period 2 did not persist in sub-period 3 even though there are statistically
significant differences in stock returns, volatility, trading volume and trading frequency. The order of
magnitude is higher in the two seconds post-ICS release compared to the two seconds pre-ICS release,
which concurs with the anticipated results when the practice of ICS early release was suspended.
Turning to Panel E, we observe contrasting results; for negative new home sales news, the fall in
mean return is larger in 10:00:00-10:00:02 than that in 9:59:58-10:00:00 (i.e. -0.0284 vs. -0.0005). In the
case of the negative ICS news, the mean return of S&P500 ETFs in the period January 2008 to June 2013,
9:54:58-9:55:00 falls by more than that in 9:55:00-9:55:02 (i.e. -0.0183 vs. -0.0016). This very different
result is indicative of the impact of ICS early peek on market quality like stock return. The finding is the

15

Note that in sub-period 1 (Panel A of Table 7), UOM publishes the ICS data at 10 a.m.; hence the two-second
window is examined before and after 10:00:00 a.m.
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exact opposite in the case of positive ICS news; mean returns are found to be higher for the period
9:54:58-9:55:00 compared to 9:55:00-9:55:02, while they are reversed for positive new home sales news.
A similar pattern of results are observed for the other measures of market quality like volatility, volume
and trade frequency.
-

Table 8 about here -

We also perform difference-in-difference analysis for ETFs data and the results are presented in
the table below. The difference-in-difference analysis involves two stages. In the first stage, we compute
the difference in the variable of interest for the period (9:54:58-9:55:00) and (9:55:00-9:55:02). In the
second stage, we test the difference in the variable of interest between the two consecutive periods with
different practices of ICS early release, namely sub-period 1 (2004/01-2006/12) and sub-period 2
(2008/01-2013/06) as reported in Panel A, and sub-period 2 and sub-period 3 (2013/07-2014/12) as
reported in Panel B. Referring to Table 8, for the variable return (%) in Panel A for negative consumer
sentiment news in sub-period 1, the difference in return between the two periods (i.e. two seconds before
and after the announcement) is small relative to sub-period 2. The t-statistics under the null that the
difference in return across the two sub-periods is equal to zero is rejected at the 1% significance level.
This is also true for the result of sub-periods 2 and 3. By and large, it can be seen that the test rejects the
null of equality in return, volatility, volume and trade frequency across the two consecutive periods,
thereby implying that the early release of ICS news in sub-period 2 did impact on the dynamic of return,
volatility, volume and trade frequency.
6. Conclusion
High frequency traders have recently been in the limelight with controversial debates over their
roles on price quality in the market. On 15 May 2013, the German High Frequency Trading Act
(“Hochfrequenzhandelsgesetz”) that addresses procedures to regulate algorithmic trading and high
frequency trading (HFT), entered into force. It indicates the importance of information release and
regulation of HFT. When Thomson Reuters/UM provided the two-second advance peek into ICS to its
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elite group of subscribers, it provided an opportunity for high frequency traders to utilize this early
information release. HFTs’ speed advantage through the use of rapid computer algorithms coupled with
information advantage through the advance peek has been scrutinized by the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission. It is in this context that we study the trading behavior of informed high frequency
traders and their market microstructure implications so as to inform market regulators on the appropriate
policy action for the practice of advance peek.
Our key contribution is that we identify HFTs, who as a group strongly benefit from the earlyaccess service. Our empirical results demonstrate that liquidity-demanding HFTs stand to benefit the most
from the early release of ICS. We show that trading volume increases sharply during the advance peek.
As informed HFTs tend to be better informed about the direction of stock price movements, they exhibit
larger trade imbalance with the volume of buyer (seller)-initiated transactions exceeding the volume of
seller (buyer)-initiated transactions for positive (negative) ICS news. Stock returns are found to react with
a two-second lag to informed HFTs’ trade imbalance. Finally, we provide an estimate of the profit made
by informed HFTs, which is substantially larger than that of non-informed traders, confirming concerns
raised by the SEC. Our empirical evidence sheds some light on possible concerns, which have emerged in
the public domain, over the harmful effects of tiered information disclosure in financial markets.
While the advance peek gives HFTs an informational advantage that may be deemed a violation
of a level playing field for equal information, the two-second advance peek remains a highly controversial
topic. From the perspective of procedural fairness, or equal application of the rules, the advance peek
does not appear to contravene this criterion. To the extent that any trader is able to generate a competitive
advantage through investment in computer algorithms for a speed advantage, the two-second advance
peek is a service that is made available to financial practitioners who subscribe to Thomson Reuters’
financial data services and is not exclusively offered to HFTs. However, underlying the argument that
anyone can purchase and utilize these services is the assumption that all parties will benefit from them
equally. Clearly, this is not the case. The two seconds early release is much more likely to benefit highfrequency traders with the ability to execute a massive number of trades per day, more than average
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institutional investors using long-term trading strategies. Further, permitting two-second tiered
information disclosure in the market can lead to informational asymmetries, which allow certain highfrequency traders to engage in predatory trading practices that take advantage of other investors without
premier access to information.
Given that the advance peek is designed for traders who are equipped with high-speed
technology, this practice grants HFTs an added advantage ahead of ordinary traders. On that basis, the
advance peek may be regarded as a practice favoring those with faster and closer access to financial
markets, which may lead to public speculation about the integrity of financial markets. Permitting a twotiered system in which HFTs are able to prey upon ordinary traders is likely to cause investors to lose
confidence and make them less willing to take action in the market. In the worst case scenario, this may
even lead to certain participants exiting from the marketplace. The result of fast traders obtaining
information before slow traders can also generate adverse selection which is not internalized. These
negative externalities can result in overinvestment in equilibrium (Biais, Foucault, and Moinas, 2015).
While the capital markets rely on investors obtaining data for prices to better reflect the fundamental
values of assets, the resources expended to provide and process faster access to data are in effect not
creating new data but instead simply accessing it more quickly (Angel and McCabe, 2018). If permitted,
such practice may encourage data providers to sell tiered information to traders at a premium cost leading
to misallocation of resources. There are also valid concerns that the appropriation of some part of the
returns to investments made at the expense of other shareholders can give rise to economically inefficient
levels of corporate investment (Manove, 1989). 16 Given the myriad concerns over the practice of insider
trading 2.0, it is no surprise that the SEC has stepped in to curtail this predatory endeavor.

16
While Manove (1989) develops a model that represents insider trading in the shares of a single corporation, that
corporation could represent an entire securities market (p. 843). The idea is that in the presence of pervasive insider
trading, future outside buyers of shares (who know they are subject to adverse selection) are unwilling to pay the full
expected value of forthcoming investment proceeds. In so doing incumbent shareholders are unable to recover the
full expected value of the returns to corporate investments. Accordingly, there is a lack of shareholder support for
corporate investment.
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Appendix

Figure A1. Intraday Patterns on New Home Sales Announcement
The figures below show intraday trading patterns for HFT spanning two minutes (one minute before and one minute after the New Home Sales announcement)
on days with New Home Sales announcements. The announcements are further classified as positive or negative news. The sample covers the period January 1,
2008 to August 31, 2009, which comprises 20 announcements days. Figures on the left-hand (right-hand) column are for positive (negative) New Home Sales
announcements. Positive (negative) announcements are for announced New Home Sales that are higher (lower) than analysts’ forecast average. The x-axis
denotes time in seconds such that t = 0 is associated with the New Home Sales announcement at 10:00 a.m. The vertical dot-lines are for t = 0, indicating the
exact time for the New Home Sales announcement. Trading volume (Figures (a) and (b)) is measured by the number of shares scaled by daily average onesecond volume, trade imbalance (Figures (c) and (d)) is defined as the number of shares in buyer-initiated transactions minus seller-initiated transactions, and
returns (Figures (e) and (f)) are defined as the first difference of the log of stock price calculated from NBBO quotes.
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Figure 1. Intraday Patterns on ICS Announcement and Non-announcement Days.
The figures below show intraday trading patterns for HFT spanning two minutes (one minute before and one minute after the ICS announcement) on days with or
without ICS announcements. ICS announcement days are ICS announcement Fridays and non-ICS announcement days are also Fridays but with no ICS
announcements made when there is no ICS announcement. ICS announcements are further classified as positive or negative news. The solid (dashed) lines are
for days with (without) announcements. The sample covers the period January 1, 2008 to August 31, 2009, which comprises 40 announcements days. Figures on
the left-hand (right-hand) column are for positive (negative) ICS announcements. Positive (negative) ICS announcements are for announced ICS that are higher
(lower) than analysts’ forecast average. The x-axis denotes time in seconds such that t = 0 is associated with the ICS announcement at 9:55 a.m. The vertical dotlines are for t = -2, indicating the exact time for the two-second advance peek into ICS. Trading volume (Figures (a) and (b)) is measured by the number of shares
scaled by daily average one-second volume, trade imbalance (Figures (c) and (d)) is defined as the number of shares in buyer-initiated transactions minus sellerinitiated transactions, and returns (Figures (e) and (f)) are defined as the first difference of the log of stock price calculated from NBBO quotes.
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Table 1. Return and Trade Characteristics for ICS Announcement and Non-ICS Announcement Days
for NASDAQ Data
This table presents mean difference tests of return, volume and trade imbalance on ICS announcement and non-ICS
announcement days. The advance peek on ICS occurred at 09:54:58 EST during the sample period from January 1,
2008 to August 31, 2009. When the value for the ICS is higher (lower) than the median forecast from the Thomson
Reuters Survey of Economists, it is regarded as positive (negative) consumer sentiment news. We compute the average
one-second interval stock return, trade volume, and trade imbalance from 9:54:58 to 9:55:00 and from 9:55:00 to
9:55:02. HFTD (non-HFTD) denote liquidity demanders of (non-) high frequency traders which is made up of the 26
accounts. Returns are defined as the first difference of the log of stock price calculated from NBBO quotes, trading
volume is measured by the number of shares traded, and trade imbalance is defined as the difference between buyerinitiated transactions and seller-initiated transactions. ICS announcement days are ICS announcement Fridays and nonICS announcement days are also Fridays but with no ICS announcements made when there is no ICS announcement.
The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Negative Consumer Sentiment News
t stat.
Panel A: ICS announcement days
Return (%)
-0.0109
-0.0087
(-2.50) **
Volume (scaled by average one-second volume each day)
3.04
1.66
HFTD
(3.68) ***
2.16
2.07
Non-HFTD
(0.38)
Trade imbalance
-186.63
-56.85
HFTD
(-5.57) ***
-172.95
-49.39
Non-HFTD
(-4.38) ***
Panel B: Non-ICS announcement days
Return (%)
-0.0014
-0.0023
(0.81)
Volume (scaled by average one-second volume each day)
0.47
0.45
HFTD
(0.23)
D
0.81
0.96
Non-HFT
(-0.86)
Trade imbalance
-7.76
-11.24
HFTD
(0.49)
D
-1.42
-8.76
Non-HFT
(0.80)
9:54:58 - 9:55:00 9:55:00 - 9:55:02
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Positive Consumer Sentiment News
9:55:00 - 9:55:02
t stat.

9:54:58 - 9:55:00

0.0147

0.0100

(5.04)

2.23
1.88

1.97
1.87

(1.08)
(0.02)

168.97
122.49

101.76
29.56

(2.91)
(4.96)

0.0011

0.0011

(-0.09 )

0.54
1.05

0.56
0.88

(-0.19)
(0.68)

17.88
4.70

8.34
-21.53

(0.86)
(0.99)

***

***
***

Table 2. Determinants of Trade Imbalance of Liquidity-Demanding HFTs and Non-HFTs
This table presents the pooled OLS regression results for the determinants of trade imbalance of liquidity-demanding
HFTD and non-HFTD. We report the coefficients from a regression of trade imbalance in 300-second intervals
before and after the announcements from January 1, 2008 to August 31, 2009. TI denotes one-second interval trade
imbalance, which is measured by the number of shares in buy-initiated transactions minus sell-initiated transactions.
All dependent variables are standardized relative to the average of each stock on each announcement day. EarlyPeek
and Release are time interval dummy variables that equal one for the intervals [9:54:58, 9:54:59] and [9:55:00,
9:55:01], and zero otherwise. Final is a dummy that equals one for Thomson Reuters/UM index of consumer
sentiment final reports and zero for mid-term reports. Large is a dummy variable for stocks with large market
capitalization, such that it takes the value of 1 if they fit the definition and 0 otherwise. Surprise is the absolute
difference between actual ICS and expected ICS. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the
White (1980) method. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses next to the coefficients. Here, *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 1%, 0.5%, and 0.1% levels, respectively. Significance levels (or critical t-values) are adjusted to
mitigate overstatement of statistical significance arising from large samples (i.e. Lindley’s paradox).
Negative Consumer Sentiment News
TI_HFTDt
TI_non-HFTDt
Panel A: Baseline
Intercept
0.0051
(2.10)
EarlyPeek
-0.6063 (-14.71) ***
Release
-0.3022 (-9.07) ***
Final
0.0002
(0.09)
Large
-0.0035 (-1.86)
Surprise
-0.0001 (-0.30)
Obs.
1,276,524
Adj. R-sq. (%)
0.16
Panel B: Interact with large firm dummy
Intercept
0.0041
(1.71)
EarlyPeek
-0.3659 (-8.40) ***
Release
-0.2592 (-5.82) ***
Final
0.0002
(0.09)
Large
-0.0007 (-0.38)
Surprise
-0.0001 (-0.30)
EarlyPeek×Large
-0.7092 (-7.38) ***
Release×Large
-0.1270 (-1.98)
Obs.
1,276,524
Adj. R-sq. (%)
0.20
Panel C: Interact with final report dummy
Intercept
0.0074
(3.03) **
EarlyPeek
-1.0414 (-14.73) ***
Release
-0.5494 (-9.48) ***
Final
-0.0049 (-2.05)
Large
-0.0035 (-1.86)
Surprise
-0.0001 (-0.30)
EarlyPeek×Final
0.9791 (13.19) ***
Release×Final
0.5562
(9.22) ***
Obs.
1,276,524
Adj. R-sq. (%)
0.26
Panel D: Interact with surprise
Intercept
0.0020
(0.83)
EarlyPeek
-0.0748 (-3.03) **
Release
-0.0619 (-2.12)

0.0018 (0.73)
-0.3212 (-10.33)
-0.1836 (-7.53)
0.0038 (1.55)
-0.0022 (-1.16)
0.0007 (1.46)
1,276,524
0.04
0.0009
(0.35)
-0.1104 (-5.21)
-0.1112 (-4.28)
0.0038
(1.55)
0.0006
(0.32)
0.0007
(1.46)
-0.6218 (-7.45)
-0.2138 (-3.74)
1,276,524
0.08
0.0030
(1.23)
-0.5561 (-10.22)
-0.3201 (-7.78)
0.0010
(0.42)
-0.0022 (-1.16)
0.0007
(1.46)
0.5286
(9.42)
0.3071
(6.81)
1,276,524
0.07
0.0003
0.0165
-0.0608

(0.11)
(0.97)
(-2.39)
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Positive Consumer Sentiment News
TI_HFTDt
TI_non-HFTDt
***
***

***
***

***
***

***
***

***
***

-0.0063 (-3.30)
0.5021 (15.87)
0.4205 (13.30)
0.0041 (2.32)
0.0019 (1.15)
0.0014 (3.21)
1,560,196
0.14

***
***

**

-0.0053 (-2.77)
0.3008
(8.26)
0.3160
(9.04)
0.0041
(2.32)
-0.0011 (-0.63)
0.0014
(3.21)
0.5940
(8.52)
0.3083
(4.26)
1,560,196
0.18

*

-0.0074 (-3.86)
0.7183 (13.77)
0.5306
(9.55)
0.0061
(3.45)
0.0019
(1.15)
0.0014
(3.21)
-0.3962 (-6.14)
-0.2018 (-3.08)
1,560,196
0.16

***

-0.0045
0.3404
0.0397

(-2.38)
(8.28)
(0.73)

***
***

**
***
***

***
***
***

**
***
**

***

-0.0008 (-0.39)
0.2157 (9.31)
0.1540 (6.87)
0.0036 (2.02)
0.0045 (2.67)
-0.0007 (-1.57)
1,560,196
0.02
-0.0002 (-0.12)
0.0580
(2.84)
0.1526
(5.39)
0.0036
(2.02)
0.0029
(1.75)
-0.0007 (-1.57)
0.4652
(7.96)
0.0040
(0.09)
1,560,196
0.04
-0.0010 (-0.50)
0.2933
(7.68)
0.1371
(4.70)
0.0040
(2.23)
0.0045
(2.67)
-0.0007 (-1.57)
-0.1422 (-3.00)
0.0310
(0.70)
1,560,196
0.03
-0.0005
0.1767
0.1121

(-0.26)
(6.22)
(3.40)

***
***

*

**
***

***

***
***

*

**

***
***

Final
0.0002
(0.09)
Large
-0.0035 (-1.86)
Surprise
0.0010
(2.13)
EarlyPeek×Surprise -0.2507 (-14.55)
Release×Surprise
-0.0885 (-6.81)
Obs.
1,276,524
Adj. R-sq. (%)
0.31
Panel E: All interaction terms
Intercept
0.0028 (1.17)
EarlyPeek
0.1565 (2.85)
Release
-0.3830 (-4.23)
Final
-0.0020 (-0.83)
Large
-0.0007 (-0.38)
Surprise
0.0007 (1.52)
EarlyPeek×Final
0.1986 (3.79)
Release×Final
0.4556 (5.89)
EarlyPeek×Large
-0.7092 (-7.71)
Release×Large
-0.1270 (-2.01)
EarlyPeek×Surprise -0.2248 (-13.85)
Release×Surprise
-0.0290 (-1.72)
Obs.
1,276,524
Adj. R-sq. (%)
0.36

***
***

**
***

***
***
***

***

0.0038
(1.56)
-0.0022 (-1.16)
0.0013
(2.66)
-0.1243 (-9.55)
-0.0452 (-5.12)
1,276,524
0.08
0.0005 (0.22)
0.0854 (2.05)
-0.2078 (-3.02)
0.0023 (0.94)
0.0006 (0.32)
0.0011 (2.24)
0.1775 (4.32)
0.2747 (4.34)
-0.6218 (-7.57)
-0.2138 (-3.77)
-0.1011 (-8.11)
-0.0093 (-0.75)
1,276,524
0.12
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*
***
***

**

***
***
***
***
***

0.0041
(2.32)
0.0019
(1.15)
0.0006
(1.45)
0.0716
(5.35)
0.1685
(6.09)
1,560,196
0.19
-0.0040 (-2.13)
0.3935
(5.40)
-0.1612 (-1.72)
0.0048
(2.73)
-0.0011 (-0.63)
0.0007
(1.62)
-0.3278 (-4.71)
0.1242
(1.83)
0.5940
(8.57)
0.3083
(4.34)
0.0381
(2.68)
0.1812
(6.04)
1,560,196
0.23

***
***

***

*

***

***
***
*
***

0.0036
(2.02)
0.0045
(2.67)
-0.0008 (-1.85)
0.0173
(2.16)
0.0186
(1.81)
1,560,196
0.03
-0.0001 (-0.06)
0.1248
(2.52)
0.0494
(0.88)
0.0038
(2.13)
0.0029
(1.75)
-0.0008 (-1.81)
-0.1363 (-2.65)
0.0789
(1.47)
0.4652
(7.97)
0.0040
(0.09)
0.0033
(0.39)
0.0266
(2.13)
1,560,196
0.04

*

*

***

Table 3. The Effects of HFTD and Non-HFTD Trade Imbalance on Stock Returns
This table presents the pooled OLS regression results for the effects of HFTD and Non-HFTD trade imbalance (TI) on
one-second stock returns. We analyze transaction data in 300-second intervals before and after the announcements
from January 1, 2008 to August 31, 2009. Trade imbalance denotes the number of shares in buyer-initiated
transactions minus seller-initiated transactions. Trade imbalance for each stock is standardized by the type of
investors on each day. The dummy variable Release takes the value of 1 for [9:55:00, 9:55:01) and zero otherwise.
Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity using the White (1980) method. The t-statistics are shown in
parentheses next to the coefficients. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 1%, 0.5%, and 0.1% levels, respectively.
Significance levels (or critical t-values) are adjusted to mitigate overstatement of statistical significance arising from
large samples (i.e. Lindley’s paradox).

Intercept
TI_HFTDt
TI_HFTDt-1
TI_HFTDt-2
TI_HFTDt-3
TI_HFTDt-4
TI_HFTDt-5
Release×TI_HFTDt
Release×TI_HFTDt-1
Release×TI_HFTDt-2
Release×TI_HFTDt-3
Release×TI_HFTDt-4
Release×TI_HFTDt-5
TI _Non-HFTDt
TI _Non-HFTDt-1
TI _Non-HFTDt-2
TI _Non-HFTDt-3
TI _Non-HFTDt-4
TI _Non-HFTDt-5
Release×TI_Non-HFTDt
Release×TI_Non-HFTDt-1
Release×TI_Non-HFTDt-2
Release×TI_Non-HFTDt-3
Release×TI_Non-HFTDt-4
Release×TI_Non-HFTDt-5
Obs.
Adj. R-sq. (%)

Negative Consumer Sentiment News
Model 1
Model 2
0.0002 (8.05) *** 0.0002 (8.04) ***
0.5265 (32.08) *** 0.5302 (31.80) ***
0.1038 (15.42) *** 0.1023 (15.02) ***
0.0291 (5.87) *** 0.0274 (5.43) ***
0.0155 (3.62) *** 0.0145 (3.34) ***
0.0072 (2.18)
0.0073 (2.21)
0.0094 (2.47)
0.0094 (2.45)
-0.2177 (-4.32) ***
0.0773 (1.91)
0.0723 (2.82) **
0.0518 (2.03)
-0.0190 (-0.44)
0.0517 (1.02)
0.5546 (38.22) *** 0.5561 (38.02) ***
0.1109 (14.04) *** 0.1109 (13.93) ***
0.0248 (5.08) *** 0.0247 (5.01) ***
0.0117 (2.89) **
0.0115 (2.81) **
0.0012 (0.30)
0.0012 (0.28)
-0.0029 (-0.67)
-0.0026 (-0.61)
-0.1852 (-3.29) ***
0.0055 (0.14)
-0.0108 (-0.26)
0.0108 (0.42)
0.0274 (0.50)
-0.1229 (-2.40)
1,276,524
1,276,524
6.42
6.43
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Positive Consumer Sentiment News
Model 1
Model 2
0.0002 (6.22) *** 0.0002 (6.20) ***
0.5716 (43.28) *** 0.5746 (42.88) ***
0.1036 (15.44) *** 0.1019 (14.99) ***
0.0316 (4.35) *** 0.0302 (4.08) ***
0.0083 (2.11)
0.0073 (1.85)
0.0087 (2.46)
0.0088 (2.47)
0.0035 (0.91)
0.0036 (0.94)
-0.1638 (-2.69) *
0.1072 (2.65) *
0.0716 (2.85) **
0.0720 (2.77) *
-0.0213 (-0.33)
-0.0398 (-0.76)
0.5727 (42.58) *** 0.5747 (42.42) ***
0.0952 (13.42) *** 0.0947 (13.30) ***
0.0142 (3.23) ** 0.0140 (3.16) **
0.0170 (3.45) *** 0.0169 (3.40) ***
0.0086 (1.55)
0.0080 (1.45)
0.0151 (3.61) *** 0.0151 (3.61) ***
-0.2344 (-2.77)
0.0999 (1.37)
-0.0031 (-0.10)
-0.0066 (-0.17)
0.1523 (1.67)
-0.0024 (-0.05)
1,560,196
1,560,196
6.07
6.08

Table 4. The Effects of HFTD and Non-HFTD Trade Imbalance on Stock Returns for different market capitalization
This table presents the pooled OLS regression results for the effects of HFTD and Non-HFTD trade imbalance (TI) on one-second stock returns. We analyze transaction data in
300-second intervals before and after the announcements from January 1, 2008 to August 31, 2009. Trade imbalance denotes the number of shares in buyer-initiated
transactions minus seller-initiated transactions. Trade imbalance for each stock is standardized by the type of investors on each day. The dummy variable Release takes the
value of 1 for [9:55:00, 9:55:01) and zero otherwise. The stocks are categorized into large, medium and small market capitalization. Standard errors are corrected for
heteroscedasticity using the White (1980) method. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses next to the coefficients. Here, *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.

Intercept
TI_HFTDt
TI_HFTDt-1
TI_HFTDt-2
TI_HFTDt-3
TI_HFTDt-4
TI_HFTDt-5
Release×TI_HFTDt
Release ×TI_HFTDt-1
Release ×TI_HFTDt-2
Release ×TI_HFTDt-3
Release ×TI_HFTDt-4
Release ×TI_HFTDt-5
TI _Non-HFTDt
TI _Non-HFTDt-1
TI _Non-HFTDt-2
TI _Non-HFTDt-3
TI _Non-HFTDt-4
TI _Non-HFTDt-5
Release ×TI_Non-HFTDt
Release ×TI_Non-HFTDt-1
Release ×TI_Non-HFTDt-2
Release ×TI_Non-HFTDt-3
Release ×TI_Non-HFTDt-4
Release ×TI_Non-HFTDt-5

Obs.
Adj. R-sq. (%)

Negative Consumer Sentiment News
Large size
Medium size
Small size
0.0002 (5.48) ***
0.0002
(4.93) ***
0.0003
(4.13)
0.6083 (54.61) ***
0.4568 (25.36) ***
0.5308 (10.19)
0.1118 (20.72) ***
0.1053
(9.75) ***
0.0869
(4.70)
0.0040 (0.88)
0.0322
(4.80) ***
0.0508
(3.53)
-0.0021 (-0.53)
0.0270
(3.47) ***
0.0229
(2.19)
-0.0018 (-0.46)
0.0092
(1.83) *
0.0188
(2.26)
0.0027 (0.66)
0.0147
(2.68) ***
0.0122
(1.17)
-0.2265 (-2.75) ***
-0.1888 (-2.91) *** -0.1276 (-1.02)
0.0829 (1.37)
0.0832
(1.77) *
0.0212
(0.14)
**
0.0877 (2.33)
0.0886
(2.34) **
-0.0177 (-0.22)
0.0463 (1.25)
0.0518
(1.31)
0.0605
(0.64)
-0.0052 (-0.06)
-0.0229 (-0.54)
-0.1092 (-1.03)
-0.0044 (-0.06)
0.1163
(1.64) *
-0.0030 (-0.09)
***
0.5158 (49.57)
0.4858 (29.70) ***
0.6662 (16.63)
0.1070 (18.35) ***
0.1143 (10.68) ***
0.1147
(5.53)
0.0170 (3.55) ***
0.0260
(3.64) ***
0.0350
(2.90)
0.0005 (0.11)
0.0202
(2.80) ***
0.0176
(1.97)
-0.0022 (-0.57)
0.0043
(0.66)
0.0040
(0.40)
-0.0022 (-0.55)
-0.0099 (-1.14)
0.0061
(0.69)
-0.1645 (-2.60) ***
-0.0918 (-0.89)
-0.3712 (-2.04)
0.0146 (0.29)
-0.0226 (-0.32)
-0.1793
(-1.11)
-0.0170 (-0.51)
0.1687
(1.20)
-0.3249 (-1.25)
0.0252 (0.82)
0.0151
(0.17)
-0.0066 (-0.12)
0.1863 (2.66) ***
-0.1009 (-0.59)
-0.0026 (-0.10)
-0.1267 (-1.63)
-0.1659 (-1.81) *
-0.1254 (-1.19)
432,720
432,720
411,084
12.82
5.72
4.53
40

***
***
***
***
**
**

***
***
***
**

**

Positive Consumer Sentiment News
Large size
Medium size
Small size
0.0001
(1.82) *
0.0002
(5.41) ***
0.0002
(3.54)
0.6689 (62.34) ***
0.5211 (28.82) ***
0.5360 (14.58)
0.1000 (19.51) ***
0.1241 (10.53) ***
0.0762
(4.57)
**
0.0118
(2.35)
0.0341
(4.82) ***
0.0461
(2.06)
0.0040
(1.08)
0.0145
(2.62) ***
0.0052
(0.49)
-0.0041 (-1.18)
0.0250
(4.20) ***
0.0055
(0.64)
-0.0079 (-2.31) **
0.0191
(3.38) ***
0.0016
(0.15)
-0.2791 (-4.40) *** -0.0813 (-0.67)
-0.1682
(-1.11)
0.2134
(3.95) ***
0.0808
(1.34)
0.0263
(0.30)
0.0426
(1.60)
0.0996
(2.31) **
0.0420
(0.58)
0.0273
(0.95)
0.1167
(2.55) **
0.0799
(1.09)
-0.0589 (-1.03)
0.0679
(0.54)
-0.1090 (-0.56)
-0.0104 (-0.14)
-0.0758 (-0.50)
-0.0143 (-0.38)
0.5301 (53.64) ***
0.5194 (27.99) ***
0.6751 (18.70)
0.0852 (15.69) ***
0.1011
(8.70) ***
0.1006
(5.76)
0.0113
(2.72) ***
0.0166
(2.57) **
0.0181
(1.65)
0.0039
(1.05)
0.0099
(1.84) *
0.0391
(2.87)
-0.0018 (-0.51)
0.0247
(2.10) **
0.0047
(0.42)
-0.0031 (-0.88)
0.0126
(2.40) **
0.0391
(3.52)
-0.0306 (-0.16)
-0.2905 (-2.74) ***
-0.3794 (-3.23)
0.0202
(0.30)
0.0221
(0.25)
0.2311
(1.13)
0.0270
(0.92)
-0.0942 (-0.92)
0.0537
(0.83)
0.0506
(1.54)
0.0543
(0.40)
-0.1923 (-1.67)
0.1045
(2.05) **
0.2575
(1.29)
0.2083
(0.88)
0.0584
(1.14)
-0.1638 (-1.23)
-0.0217 (-0.27)
528,880
528,880
502,436
13.83
6.26
3.68

***
***
***
**

***
***
*
***

***
***

Table 5. The Effects of HFTD and Non-HFTD Trade Imbalance on Stock Returns for heterogeneous surprise level
This table presents the pooled OLS regression results for the effects of HFTD and Non-HFTD trade imbalance (TI) on one-second stock returns. We analyze transaction data in
300-second intervals before and after the announcements from January 1, 2008 to August 31, 2009. Trade imbalance denotes the number of shares in buyer-initiated
transactions minus seller-initiated transactions. Trade imbalance for each stock is standardized by the type of investors on each day. The dummy variable Release takes the
value of 1 for [9:55:00, 9:55:01) and zero otherwise. News surprises of the ICS announcements are defined as the difference between market expectations and the announced
values of ICS. The surprise levels are categorized into high, medium and low with the highest tertile corresponding to the large surprise, the middle is the medium surprise,
and the lowest is the small surprise. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity using the White (1980) method. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses next to the
coefficients. Here, *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Negative Consumer Sentiment News
Positive Consumer Sentiment News
High surprise
Medium surprise
Low surprise
High surprise
Medium surprise
Low surprise
Intercept
0.0003 (5.69) ***
0.0000
(0.37)
0.0004
(8.48) ***
0.0005
(9.55) ***
-0.0001 (-1.56)
0.0001
(2.75) ***
***
***
***
***
***
D
TI_HFT t
0.5349 (22.92)
0.6011 (15.22)
0.4560 (22.40)
0.5558 (24.75)
0.6256 (23.18)
0.5486 (26.97) ***
***
***
***
***
***
D
TI_HFT t-1
0.1149 (9.26)
0.0818
(6.44)
0.1090 (10.79)
0.1081
(9.53)
0.1103
(7.85)
0.0878
(8.71) ***
***
***
***
***
***
D
TI_HFT t-2
0.0335 (3.14)
0.0268
(3.62)
0.0217
(2.79)
0.0307
(4.04)
0.0323
(2.99)
0.0276
(1.54)
TI_HFTDt-3
0.0230 (2.63) ***
0.0180
(2.31) **
0.0023
(0.40)
0.0113
(1.47)
0.0049
(0.65)
0.0048
(0.94)
TI_HFTDt-4
0.0132 (2.14) **
-0.0013 (-0.24)
0.0093
(1.72) *
0.0109
(1.70) *
0.0136
(1.74) *
0.0020
(0.52)
TI_HFTDt-5
0.0159 (2.16) **
0.0048
(0.73)
0.0062
(1.09)
0.0029
(0.44)
0.0081
(0.92)
0.0001
(0.03)
Release×TI_HFTDt
-0.1296 (-1.75) *
-0.4085
(-6.89) ***
-0.3378 (-5.59) ***
-0.1957 (-2.76) ***
-0.0976 (-0.48)
-0.1386 (-1.33)
Release ×TI_HFTDt-1
0.0446 (0.82)
0.1419
(2.01) **
-0.0085 (-0.13)
0.1246
(2.53) **
0.1091 (1.74) *
-0.0225 (-0.17)
***
*
***
D
Release ×TI_HFT t-2
0.0765 (2.58)
0.1367
(1.65)
-0.0549 (-1.33)
0.1668
(3.14)
-0.0001
(0.00)
0.0304
(0.96)
Release ×TI_HFTDt-3
0.0312 (1.15)
0.2027
(5.45) ***
-0.0363 (-1.15)
0.0979
(1.53)
0.0078 (0.30)
0.1520
(3.58) ***
D
Release ×TI_HFT t-4
-0.6324 (-1.46)
0.0074
(0.18)
0.1376
(0.82)
0.0676
(0.77)
-0.0722 (-1.28)
-0.2745 (-1.54)
Release ×TI_HFTDt-5
0.0834 (0.89)
0.0704
(0.93)
-0.0575 (-0.81)
-0.0937 (-0.90)
0.1219 (1.40)
0.0195
(0.30)
TI _Non-HFTDt
0.5632 (23.35) ***
0.5535 (19.72) ***
0.5507 (23.98) ***
0.6128 (21.99) ***
0.5701 (27.05) ***
0.5422 (25.91) ***
TI _Non-HFTDt-1
0.1099 (8.00) ***
0.1144
(7.04) ***
0.1089 (10.76) ***
0.0863
(7.06) ***
0.1070 (10.01) ***
0.0906
(6.54) ***
***
**
***
***
D
TI _Non-HFT t-2
0.0255 (3.09)
0.0205
(2.10)
0.0292
(4.12)
0.0043
(0.45)
0.0203
(2.93)
0.0169
(2.64) ***
**
**
D
TI _Non-HFT t-3
0.0101 (1.35)
0.0095
(1.53)
0.0155
(2.07)
0.0079
(0.92)
0.0185
(2.41)
0.0235
(2.52) **
D
TI _Non-HFT t-4
-0.0021 (-0.32)
-0.0002 (-0.03)
0.0064
(0.82)
0.0041
(0.55)
0.0126
(1.31)
0.0073
(0.66)
TI _Non-HFTDt-5
-0.0068 (-0.82)
0.0009
(0.13)
-0.0019 (-0.29)
0.0140
(2.37) **
0.0224
(2.70) ***
0.0090
(1.24)
Release ×TI_Non-HFTDt -0.2490 (-2.89) ***
-0.1425
(-1.59)
-0.0574 (-0.60)
-0.3289 (-2.49) **
-0.2285 (-1.76) *
-0.1538 (-1.03)
Release ×TI_Non-HFTDt-1 -0.0334 (-0.56)
0.0297
(0.58)
0.0071
(0.08)
0.2538
(1.51)
0.0637 (0.80)
-0.0258 (-0.53)
Release ×TI_Non-HFTDt-2 -0.0216 (-0.47)
0.1068
(1.51)
-0.0248 (-0.38)
-0.0625 (-0.95)
0.0130 (0.35)
0.0551
(0.99)
Release ×TI_Non-HFTDt-3 0.0057 (0.20)
0.1410
(1.74) *
0.0460
(0.89)
0.0476
(0.64)
-0.0610 (-1.59)
-0.0405 (-0.67)
Release ×TI_Non-HFTDt-4 -0.0468 (-0.25)
0.1276
(1.77) *
-0.0127 (-0.37)
0.1199
(1.54)
-0.0390 (-0.63)
0.4857
(1.06)
D
Release ×TI_Non-HFT t-5 -0.1845 (-1.40)
-0.1405
(-1.54)
-0.0460 (-0.74)
-0.1360 (-1.17)
0.0864 (2.48) **
-0.0627 (-0.82)
Obs.
425,508
425,508
425,508
496,426
496,426
567,344
Adj. R-sq. (%)
6.04
6.74
6.70
6.05
5.78
6.59
41

Table 6. Trading Profits of Liquidity-Demanders and Liquidity-Suppliers for HFTs and Non-HFTs
This table presents results on HFTs and non-HFTs’ trading profits. Profits are calculated for liquidity-demanders (Panel
A) and liquidity-suppliers (Panel B). HFTD (HFTS) and Non-HFTD (Non-HFTS) denote liquidity-demanding (supplying)
HFT and non-HFT, respectively. We analyze transaction data on ICS announcement days from January 1, 2008 to
August 31, 2009. The column “Open position” denotes the timing of buy or sell transactions during the advance peek on
ICS such that 9:54:58 (9:54:59) denotes two (one) seconds before the ICS announcements at 9:55:00 a.m. We assume
traders close their positions at various times from 9:55:00 a.m. to 9:56:00 a.m. Settlement price for closing a position is
represented by the average price at the time of closing out the position. If no price occurs at that time, we employ the last
close price for that stock. The numbers of investors for HFT and Non-HFT originate from 26 high frequency trading
firms and the remaining market participants, respectively.
Close position
Open position

9:55:00
9:55:01
Panel A: Liquidity-demanders
HFTD
33,826
35,700
9:54:58
5,017
6,049
9:54:59
D
Non-HFT
30,704
33,107
9:54:58
-283
207
9:54:59

9:55:02

9:55:03

9:55:04

9:55:05

9:55:30

9:56:00

37,747
6,836

39,700
5,726

41,637
6,362

41,484
5,768

14,980
-4,178

7,996
-7,046

34,901
283

35,968
501

36,352
619

36,224
459

10,707
179

8,594
-1,374

Close position
Open position

9:55:00
Panel B: Liquidity-suppliers
HFTS
-27,213
9:54:58
-756
9:54:59
S
Non-HFT
-37,343
9:54:58
-4,019
9:54:59

9:55:01

9:55:02

9:55:03

9:55:04

9:55:05

9:55:30

9:56:00

-28,818
-1,184

-30,685
-1,156

-31,420
-566

-33,356
-1,172

-33,464
-1,041

-11,125
713

-8,185
344

-40,014
-5,112

-41,988
-6,004

-44,274
-5,703

-44,659
-5,851

-44,269
-5,227

-14,587
3,245

-8,430
8,035
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Table 7. Return and Trade Characteristics for ICS and New Home Sales Announcements for S&P 500
ETFs
This table presents mean difference tests of return, volume and trade imbalance on ICS announcement days. The advance
peek on ICS occurred at 09:54:58 EST during the sample period from January 1, 2008 to August 31, 2009. For the period
January 1, 2004 – December 31, 2006, the University of Michigan published the ICS data at 10:00am. When the value for
the ICS is higher (lower) than the median forecast from the Thomson Reuters Survey of Economists, it is regarded as
positive (negative) consumer sentiment news. We compute the average one-second interval stock return, trade volume, and
trade imbalance from 9:54:58 to 9:55:00 and from 9:55:00 to 9:55:02. Returns are defined as the first difference of the log
of stock price calculated from NBBO quotes, volatility is measured by the absolute return, trading volume is measured by
the number of shares traded, and trade frequency is defined as the average number of trades per second. ICS announcement
days are ICS announcement Fridays. Results for ICS announcements are in Panels A to C whilst those for new home sales
announcements are in Panels D to F. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
Negative Consumer Sentiment News
t stat.
Panel A: Jan. 2004-Dec. 2006
Return (%)
-0.0003
-0.0001 (-0.33)
Volatility
0.0014
0.0020 (-1.26)
Volume
1,081.58
768.42 (0.70)
Trade frequency
3.78
2.58 (0.70)
9:54:58 - 9:55:00 9:55:00 - 9:55:02
t stat.
Panel B: Jan. 2008-Jun. 2013
Return (%)
-0.0183
-0.0016 (-4.87) ***
Volatility
0.0211
0.0068 (4.42) ***
Volume
32,092.48
8,681.37 (4.23) ***
Trade frequency
56.91
16.81 (5.01) ***
Panel C: Jul. 2013-Dec. 2014
Return (%)
-0.00002
-0.0030 (2.83) ***
Volatility
0.0008
0.0039 (-3.32) ***
Volume
1,337.03
4,938.19 (-2.32) **
Trade frequency
3.56
13.36 (-3.60) ***
Negative New Home Sales News
9:59:58 - 10:00:00 10:00:00 - 10:00:02
t stat.
Panel D: Jan. 2004-Dec. 2006
Return (%)
-0.0001
-0.0001 (0.13)
9:59:58 - 10:00:00 10:00:00 - 10:00:02

Volatility
Volume
Trade frequency

Positive Consumer Sentiment News
t stat.

9:59:58 - 10:00:00 10:00:00 - 10:00:02

0.0005
0.0014
491.178
1.19
9:54:58 - 9:55:00

0.0157
0.0193
25,520.20
41.73

0.0001 (0.90)
0.0009 (0.93)
1,150.00 (-1.19)
2.21 (-0.96)
9:55:00 - 9:55:02
t stat.
0.0007
0.0076
7,793.55
15.65

(6.08)
(5.37)
(3.57)
(4.84)

***
***
***
***

0.0003
0.0019 (-1.64)
0.0019
0.0029 (-1.31)
1012.94
4396.14 (-2.47) **
4.38
9.00 (-0.80)
Positive New Home Sales News
9:59:58 - 10:00:00 10:00:00 - 10:00:02
t stat.
-0.0002

0.0009 (-1.94)

**
*

0.0006

0.0001

(1.24)

0.0004

0.0013 (-1.68)

1268.75

159.38

(1.42)

457.50

1162.50 (-0.95)

2.88

0.34

(1.58)

2.53

-0.0005

-0.0284

(5.09)

***

0.0036

0.0253 (-3.51)

***

0.0066

0.0329 (-5.19)

***

0.0068

0.0324 (-4.63)

***

3,705.81

28,664.66 (-5.67)

***

6,722.19

33,094.55 (-4.77)

***

54.09 (-6.71)

***

9.66

59.05 (-6.48)

***

-0.0017

0.0092 (-2.04)

*

***

0.0017

0.0118 (-2.08)

*

**

568.42

10,038.00 (-2.68)

**

1.83

25.50 (-2.84)

**

2.35

(0.11)

Panel E: Jan. 2008-Jun. 2013
Return (%)
Volatility
Volume
Trade frequency

8.05

Panel F: Jul. 2013-Dec. 2014
Return (%)

0.0002

Volatility

0.0016

0.0104 (-3.05)

1,233.56

14,236.94 (-2.86)

Volume
Trade frequency

6.17

-0.0046

(1.28)

45.67 (-3.15)
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Table 8. Difference-in-Difference Analysis for S&P 500 ETFs (January 2004 - December 2014)
This table presents difference-in-difference tests of return, volume and trade imbalance on ICS announcement and non-ICS
announcement days. The advance peek on ICS occurred at 09:54:58 EST during the sample period from January 1, 2008 to
August 31, 2009. When the value for the ICS is higher (lower) than the median forecast from the Thomson Reuters Survey
of Economists, it is regarded as positive (negative) consumer sentiment news. We compute the average one-second interval
stock return, trade volume, and trade imbalance from 9:54:58 to 9:55:00 and from 9:55:00 to 9:55:02. Returns are defined
as the first difference of the log of stock price calculated from NBBO quotes, volatility is measured by the absolute return,
trading volume is measured by the number of shares traded, and trade frequency is defined as the average number of trades
per second. ICS announcement days are ICS announcement Fridays. The difference-in-difference analysis involves two
stages. In the first stage, we compute the difference in the variable of interest for the period (9:54:58-9:55:00) and (9:55:009:55:02). In the second stage, we test the difference in the variable of interest between the two consecutive periods, namely
period 1 and period 2 as reported in Panel A, and period 2 and period 3 as reported in Panel B. Results for new home sales
announcements are reported in Panels C and D. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
Negative Consumer Sentiment News
Positive Consumer Sentiment News
Panel A: Testing for the Difference between sub-period 1(2004/01-2006/12) and sub-period 2 (2008/01-2013/06)
Sub-period 1:
Sub-period 2:
t stat.
Sub-period 1:
Sub-period 2:
t stat.
***
Return (%)
-0.0002
-0.0167
5.19
0.0005
0.0150
-6.77 ***
Volatility
-0.0007
0.0143
-5.13 ***
0.0004
0.0117
-5.90 **
***
Volume
313.16
23,411.11
-4.30
-658.82
17,726.65
-4.01 ***
Trade frequency
1.20
40.10
-5.01 ***
-1.01
26.08
-5.63 ***
Panel B: Testing for the Difference between sub-period 2 (2008/01-2013/06) and sub-period 3 (2013/07-2014/12)
Sub-period 2:
Sub-period 3:
t stat.
Sub-period 2:
Sub-period 3:
t stat.
***
Return (%)
-0.0167
0.0029
-6.06
0.0150
-0.0015
7.32 ***
***
Volatility
0.0143
-0.0031
5.74
0.0117
-0.0010
6.29 **
Volume
23,411.11
-3,601.17
4.77 ***
17,726.65
-3,383.19
4.47 ***
***
Trade frequency
40.10
-9.36
5.84
26.08
-9.08
6.05 ***
Negative New Home Sales News
Positive New Home Sales News
Panel C: Testing for the Difference between sub-period 1(2004/01-2006/12) and sub-period 2 (2008/01-2013/06)
Sub-period 1:
Sub-period 2:
t stat.
Sub-period 1:
Sub-period 2:
t stat.
***
0.0001
0.0279
-0.0011
-0.0217
Return (%)
-4.99
3.21 ***
***
0.0005
-0.0263
-0.0009
-0.0256
Volatility
5.66
4.44 ***
1,109.38
-24,958.85
-705.00
-26,372.36
Volume
6.61 ***
5.84 ***
***
2.53
-46.04
0.18
-49.40
Trade frequency
6.17
4.49 ***
Panel D: Testing for the Difference between sub-period 2 (2008/01-2013/06) and sub-period 3 (2013/07-2014/12)
Sub-period 2:
Sub-period 3:
t stat.
Sub-period 2:
Sub-period 3:
t stat.
0.0279
0.0047
-0.0217
-0.0109 -1.24
Return (%)
3.38 ***
-0.0263
-0.0089 -3.29 ***
-0.0256
-0.0101 -2.22 **
Volatility
-24,958.85
-13,003.39
-26,372.36
-9,469.58
Volume
-0.45
-2.39 **
-46.04
-39.50 -1.98 *
-49.40
-23.67 -2.66 **
Trade frequency

44

